The TAR for Abruzzo (Tribunale Amministrativo Regionale, the Regional Administrative Court), sitting in its Pescara branch, has ruled, in judgment No 245/2026, that hunting may be prevented on one’s own land, or on other property, on ethical grounds.
The procedural history: to understand the significance of this decision, the facts of the case must be briefly retraced. In 2020 a private citizen, Ms Cellini, submitted an application to the President of the Abruzzo Region seeking a ban on hunting on her own land, relying on Article 15(4) of legge n. 157/1992 (Law No 157/1992, Italy’s framework law on wildlife protection and hunting). The Agriculture Department of the Abruzzo Region refused the request, by decision No DPD023/143 of 31 March 2021, asserting that, had it been granted, the planning of hunting activity would have been hindered. Each year, in fact, the Regions plan the hunting season, setting its dates, the territories in which it will take place, and more. Against this refusal, Ms Cellini brought an appeal before the TAR, which granted her application by way of interim relief, finding her grounds prima facie well founded.
The Agriculture Department of the Abruzzo Region then issued a new decision, No DPD023/143/2021, confirming its earlier ruling and putting forward yet further additional reasons. In response to this latest refusal, Ms Cellini in turn filed supplementary grounds of appeal with the TAR.
But which provisions, exactly, frame this situation? Article 10 of legge n. 157/1992.
In the view of the Agriculture Department of the Abruzzo Region, the request had to be rejected because, under Article 10(3) of legge n. 157/1992, the 30% quota of agro-forestry-pastoral land set aside for the protection of wildlife — and therefore closed to hunting — had been secured, so that the rest of the territory could be open to hunting, in accordance with the hunting plan.
Faced with this further refusal, the applicant filed additional grounds. The main ones — which would prove decisive for the case at hand — were both upheld by the TAR. The first issue revolves around the 30% quota: through a combined reading of Article 10(3), Article 14 and Article 15(4), the TAR clarified that the 20-30% threshold (the ground on which the Department’s refusal rested) is to be understood not as a maximum limit, but rather as a minimum limit to be set on the planning of hunting activity.
Specifically, the court cited judgment No 1998 of 31 March 2011 of the Council of State (Consiglio di Stato), which made clear that the 20-30% quota required by Article 10(3) represents only a “minimum threshold” and may be exceeded, since a reading of other provisions of legge n. 157/92 (e.g. Article 15(4) and Article 14) clearly reveals an objective of protection, both of wild animals and of private property.
The Regions may therefore well go beyond the 20-30% quotas and thus withdraw further land from hunting. This interpretation is, moreover, corroborated by other decisions of other Regional Administrative Courts (see judgment No 1055 of the TAR for Sicily of 25 May 2020, or the TAR for Lombardy, judgment No 4404 of 21 July 2009), which underline the gradual affirmation of the primacy of the public interest in the conservation of wildlife over the private interest in the pursuit of hunting.
The other ground on which the TAR upheld Ms Cellini’s appeal concerns ethical reasons, and it is the true novelty of this decision. The regional court highlighted the relevance of the ethical sphere. The judgment states that “a landowner is not required to tolerate others hunting on their land, if the pursuit of that activity conflicts with their own personal and moral convictions”.
This position is consistent with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The European Court has indeed, and rightly, invoked on several occasions Article 9 of the ECHR (the European Convention on Human Rights), which enshrines freedom of thought — a freedom that also encompasses the right to object to hunting. In doing so, the European judges have embraced a broader conception of property, one that extends as far as preventing hunting where it conflicts with the owner’s personal ideas and convictions.
The TAR also pointed out that the primary legislation of reference (legge n. 157/1992, that is) lays down, as a general rule, only one condition barring the withdrawal of private land: the prohibition on obstructing wildlife and hunting planning. Accordingly, only if withdrawing that particular piece of land would curtail or obstruct hunting planning could the request be rejected.
The judgment under review carries a twofold significance. On the one hand, it forms part of an increasingly settled body of case law on the correct interpretation of the 20-30% quotas laid down by Article 10(3) of legge n. 157/1992. At the same time, it grants recognition and greater weight to the moral and ethical sphere of the landowner.
